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P. Kirkpatrick, Lyman B.  
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# CIA Flaws Examined by Ex-Member

THE REAL C.I.A., by Lyman B. Kirkpatrick Jr.; Macmillan, New York; \$6.95.

Readers who might be led by the title to expect Commander Goldfinger of USS Pueblo can forget it. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick Jr., executive director of the Central Intelligence Agency from 1962 until 1965, examines and criticizes the strengths and weaknesses of the CIA, but there are, understandably, no inside revelations concerning the CIA's covert, or "black" operations.

Interest has centered on Kirkpatrick's evaluation of the disastrous U.S.-backed Cuban invasion attempt of 1961. The Bay of Pigs failures, Kirkpatrick writes, "were primarily those of the Central Intelligence Agency, because it had been given the responsibility for the conduct of the operation and the operation was a failure."

YET THE causes of failure were much deeper than mere intelligence mistakes, says the 51-year-old author, who at the time of the Cuban operation was the CIA's inspector general and as such was instructed by then director Allen Dulles to conduct a complete post mortem on the abortive coup.

"Basically," Kirkpatrick writes, "the operation had been well implemented. It had not succeeded because there had been a complete miscalculation by the CIA operators of what was required to do the job."

Over-optimism and lack of objective appraisal allowed the invasion attempt to pro-

ceed even after it became obvious that the political "noise level" had reached dangerous proportions, and that it was going to be difficult if not impossible to deny the U.S. role in the operation. Of this, Kirkpatrick says:

"The President (John F. Kennedy) lacked any staff organization to review the operation. The briefers came in, talked to him . . . and then left. There were no staff papers to speak of; there were no evaluation studies; and because it was a covert operation everybody treated it as super hush-hush. This was a mistake. Within the top echelons of government, it should have been more widely reviewed. The President, as he did later in the Cuban missile crisis, should have had the best brains in Washington reviewing, analyzing and passing judgment."

AS FOR THE future, Kirk-

patrick offers a warning that sounds eminently sound, especially as the North Korean seizure of a U.S. electronics surveillance vessel centers attention once again on the nation's intelligence-gathering apparatus.

He suggests that policy makers must be better informed not only as to intelligence capabilities but also, and particularly, as to limitations.

The same group of people should not process the intelligence, plan the operation, "sell" the project to the policy makers and finally direct the final effort. This, Kirkpatrick says, was the basic flaw at the Bay of Pigs, and it must not happen again.

"Finally," he writes — and this may be the book's most significant message — "The most important lesson of all (from Cuba, 1961) was that it is seldom possible to do some-

thing by irregular means that the United States is not prepared to do by diplomacy or direct military action."

A lot of people who have been criticizing the CIA would certainly buy that idea.

KIRKPATRICK RETIRED as the CIA's No. 3 man in 1965 to become professor of political science at Brown University. His book is objective and readable, if somewhat tiresome when he describes the organizational jealousies that seem to be a perpetual plague in the intelligence industry.

It seems sometimes that the people are so busy working out intra-agency crises it's a wonder they have energy left over for the Communists.

Review copies of the book are shot through with editorial and typographical lapses. The book really deserved better care.

—FRANK FRIAUF